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BANKS AND BANKING-DEPOSis--AcTIONS.-MURPHY v. FRANKLIN
SAVINGS BANK IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Er AL., ii6 N. Y. Supp. 228.-
A wife, upon heir marriage, had her deposit at a bank transferred from her
individual account to the joint account of herself and husband, so that
the signatures of both were required to withdraw funds. Held, that the
husband had such an apparent interest in the deposit that he should be
made a party to an action to compel the bank to pay it. Houghton, J..
dissenting.
When money is received in a bank on general deposit, it becomes the
property of the bank, and the amount is a debt payable on demand by the
bank to the person entitled to it. Coffin v. Anderson, 4 Black 395. It is
laid down in Rand v. State Nat. Bank, 77 N. C. 152, and seems to be the
prevailing doctrine, that when two persons have deposited money and
papers with a bank upon the agreement that the same shall be drawn out
only upon their joint order, action by one against the bank for recovery
of the deposits, to which the other was not made a party, is not main-
tainable. The dissenting judge disagrees with the doctrine of the case at
hand, in that the actual owner of money on deposit in a bank is entitled to
the same by proving ownership, notwithstanding the particular form in
which the deposit is made. Nolting v. Natl. Bank, 99 Va. 54. But where
the ownership of a fund is in doubt, the question will not be determined
until all parties interested are before the court. In re Marshall, 5 Dem. Sur.
(N. Y.) 357.
CiviL RIGHTS-DRAwING OF JURY-EXCLUSION OF DISREPUTABLE
NEGROES.-STATE V. LAWRENCE, 50 SO. 406 (LA.).-Held, that the fact that
the jury commissioners select persons for service on juries with the aid
of a city directory, from which are excluded only the names of disrepu-
table negroes, affords a defendant in a criminal prosecution, even if
colored, no legal ground of complaint.
It has been repeatedly held that whenever by state action all persons
of the African race are excluded from the jury on account of their race
and color, in the trial of a negro, such action is contrary to the I4th Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution. Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U. S.
303; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U: S. 370, 397; Gibson v. Mississippi, z62
U. S. 565. And this is true, whether the action is by the state itself or
by its agencies. Ex parte Virginia, ioo U. S. 339. However, the un-
authorized act of the agent of a state is not chargeable against the state,
but is subject to review and correction by the courts. Virginia v. Rives,
100 U. S. 313. When there has been no discrimination on account of color
in selecting the jury, a reversal will not be granted to a colored man be-
cause no colored men were on the jury. Bush v. Commonwealth, 107
U. S. IO; Haggard v. Commonwealth, 79 Ky. 366; State v. Joseph, 45
La. Arin. 5o3. This is true even where no colored man was a member of
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the jury commission, of the grand jury, or of the petit jury. Hanna v.
State, 105 S. W. 793 (Tex.); Lewis v. State, 45 So. 360 (Miss.). The
general law is well stated in Dixon v. State, 74 Miss. 271; Gibson v. State,
z62 U. S. 565.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVACY-PICTUREs.-FoSTER-MILBURN Co. v.
CHINN, i20 S. W. 364 (Ky.).-Held, that a person is entitled to the right
of privacy as to his picture, and that the publication of the picture of a
person without his consent as a part of exploiting the publisher's business,
is a violation of the right of privacy, and entitles him to recover without
proof of special damages.
The right of privacy prior to i8go was practically unknown to the
common law in this country. 4 Harvard Law Review, 193. The older
decisions in this respect being based upon property or contractual rights.
Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. 209; Prince Albert v. Strange, I McN.
& G. 24. On the right of privacy independent of property or contractual
rights, the modern decisions are in conflict. I Cooley on Torts, 365 (3rd).
In a suit to restrain the unauthorized publication of a photograph, the
New York courts decided against this right. Robertson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538. A contrary rule prevails, however, in
some jurisdictions, where the courts give relief as a purely personal right.
Edison v. Edison Polyforn Mfg. Co., 67 Atl. 392 (N. J.) ; see also 18 Yale
Law Journal, 127. However, when a private individual becomes a public
character, he waives all right to privacy. Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 28o.
The right when it does exist is purely personal. Murray v. Lithographic
Co., 28 N. Y. Supp. 271.
CORPORATIONs-PowER TO PURCHASE THEIR OWN STOCK-MosES V.
SoUL=, II8 N. Y. SuPP. 41o.-Held, that a provision in incorporation
articles or by-laws which prohibits a stockholder from selling his stock
without first giving the corporation and other stockholders opportunity to
purchase, is not against public policy.
Unless the charter or governing statute limits specified cases, as in
State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424, every corporation by the principle of
common law possesses the inherent power to make by-laws, although such
power may not be expressly conferred in its charter, or in the statute of
its creation. People v. Erie Co. Medical Soc., 24 Barb. 570 (N. Y.).
However, the prevailing doctrine is that a by-law prohibiting the alienation
of stock, or putting restrictions thereon is void as being in restraint of
trade and against public policy. Taylor v. Edson, 58 Mass. 522; Bright-
well v. Mallory, I8 Tenn. 196; Board of Com'rs of Tippecanoe Co. v. Rey-
nolds, 44 Ind. 509. Even if the restriction is indorsed on the certificate
of stock. Herring v. Ruskin Co. Op. Ass'n, 53 S. W. 327 (Tenn.). And
in New York, section two of the General Corporation Law authorizing a
corporation to make by-laws for the transfer of its stock, does not em-
power it to limit the unconditional right of transferring the stock. Kinnan
v. Sullivan Country Club, 50 N. Y. Supp. 95. But a by-law adopted by a
corporation, forbidding the transfer of stock so long as the owner is in-
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debted to the corporation is valid, although inconsistent with the general
law of the state governing the transfer of property. Farmer's Bank v.
Wasson, 48 Iowa 336; Mechanics Bank v. Merchants Bank, 45 Mo. 513.
CoRPoRATioNs-AcTIONS BY REcEIVERS-SET OFF.-COURTRIGHT ET AL.
v. VREELAND, 117 N. Y. SuPP. 952.-Held, that where receivers of a cor-
poration appointed in Pennsylvania sued in New York on an undertaking
of defendant and another to pay damages sustained by the corporation
from an attachment, alleging the assignment of the claim to them by the
corporation, defendant could set off a judgment obtained in New York
against the corporation, assigned to defendant before the assignment of
the claim sued on to plaintiffs, but after their appointment as receivers.
On the appointment of receivers for an insolvent corporation, the
rights of the corporation and its creditors who are under the jurisdiction
of the appointing court become fixed. Colt v. Brown, 12 Gray (Mass.)
233. Accordingly, claims against the corporation which are assigned to
debtors of the corporation after the appointment of receivers cannot be
advanced by way of set off. Ogden v. Cowley, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 273;
Long v. Penn. Ins. Co.. 6 Pa. St. 421. If the debtor to be pursued must
be sued in another jurisdiction, however, the case is different. It is well
established that in the absence of statute, the debtor of an insolvent cor-
poration may set off claims of his against the corporation which have
accrued to him personally before the appointment of the receivers. Whea-
ton v. Daily Telegraph Co., I24 Fed. 6I; Mix v. Ellis, x8 Ga. 345: So,
although states, by comity, often do recognize the appointment of re-
ceivers in other jurisdictions, they generally will not recognize such ap-
pointment when by doing so they would interfere with the rights of local
creditors. Booth v. Clark, i7 How. (U. S.) 331; Blake v. Williams, 6
Pick. 285.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-OFFICERS-COMPENSATION-?AYMFENT TO
OFFICER DE FACTO.-STEARNS V. SIMS, IO4 PAC. 44 (OKLA.).-Held, that
where a de jure chief of police of a city is pending suit on charges against
him in the district court, wrongfully suspended by order of the judge
thereof at chambers, which said order is later set aside and said suit dis-
missed, and where said city pays a substitute chief of police de facto,
during his incumbency, the salary provided by law, the original officer de
jure after obtaining possession of the office cannot recover from the city
the salary for the same period.
The preponderance of authority is with the above case and holds that
a de jure officer cannot recover salary from a municipal corporation, which
has been paid to a de facto official for services rendered during suspension
of the officer de jure. Chicago v. Luthardt, ipI Il. 516; Newark v. Mc-
Donald, 58 N. J. L. I2; Seifen v. Racine, 129 Wis. 343. In Westberg v.
Kansas City, 64 Mo. 493, the court holds that whether removed or sus-
pended the de jure officer was not entitled to recover his salary or any
part thereof from date of suspension. On the other hand, numerous juris-
dictions hold that de jure officers can recover their compensation from the
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municipal corporation when suspended without cause. Emmett v. New
York, 128 N. Y. 217; Andrews v. Portland, 73 Me. 484. Several juris-
dictions rule that the salary of an office is an incident to its title and not to
its occupation. Carroll v. Siebenthaler, 37 Cal. 193; Tanner v. Utah, 31
Utah 8o. Contra: Gorman v. County, I Idaho 655. holds that the right
to compensation is an incident to the service rendered and not to the
office. In some states where the de jure official cannot recover his salary
from the municipal corporation, the de facto officer is liable to the officer
de jure for the salary wrongfully received. Coughlin v. McElroy, 74
Conn. 397.
CRIMINAL LAW-IDENTITY-IDENTITY OF PERSONS.-STATE V. LEPITRE,
103 PAc. 27 (WAsH.).-Held, that on an issue of the defendant's identity,
as the person alleged to have been previously convicted, identity of name
was prima facie evidence of the identity of the person and sufficient to
establish a prima facie case.
It is an inference of fact that identity of name indicates an indentity
of person. Lee v. Murphy, IIg Cal. 364. But some doubt has been inti-
mated as to whether the mere identity of name would make out a prima
facie case without further proof of corroborating circumstances. 2 Green-
leaf on Evidence, Sect. 278 d. And very slight evidence may be sufficient
to overcome the presumption of identity of person raised by the identity
of name. Morris v. I1cClary, 43 Minn. 346. There is old authority to the
effect that in criminal cases the presumption of innocence without addi-
tional proof is sufficient to overcome this presumption of identity of per-
son. Wedgwood's Case, 8 Me. 75. But the more modern rule would seem
to be contrary. State v. McGuire, 87 Mo. 642.
CRIMINAL LAw-EiDENCE-OPINION.-STATE v. HAMILTON, 49 SOUTH-
ERN REPORTER, i04 (LA.).-In a case of homicide, an eye-witness was
asked his opinion as to which of the parties to the difficulty was in the
most danger of being shot. Held, inadmissible. Monroe, J., dissenting.
Generally, testimony of opinion is excluded except in a few cases.
Taylor on Evidencc, Sect. 1414. But in some cases, opinions formed from
personal observations may be admissible as being the best evidence that the
nature of the case admits of. DeWitt v. Barley, 17 N. Y. 34o. There are cer-
tain qualifications to the admission of such evidence. The witness' opportu-
nity of observation must first justify an opinion. State v. Baldwin, 36 Kans.
I. Furthermore, if the opinion of a witness is allowed, the opinion must be
based upon matter such as men in general are capable of comprehending.
Russell v. State, 66 Neb. 497. And if the facts and circumstances can be so
clearly defined by testimony that the jury can form a correct conclusion
therefrom, the opinion of the witness will not be allowed. Thomas v.
State, 122 Ga. I5I; State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 6oo; State v. Musgrave, 43
W. Va. 672. In any instance, a question calling for the opinion of a non-
expert will be carefully scrutinized. Territory v. Claypool, ii N. M. 568.
DAMAGES-PERSONAL INjURIES-FUTURE MENTAL SUFFERING-IN-
STRUCTIONS.-UNITED STATES ExPREss Co. v. WAHL. I68 FED. 848 (OHIo).
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-Held, that an instruction which permitted the jury, in estimating plain-
tiff's damages, to consider humiliation resulting from the loss of an eye,
was not erroneous.
Humiliation as an element in estimating damages can only be taken
into consideratino when there is actual physical injury. Newport News &
M. V. Co. v. Gholson, io Ky. L. R. 938; Pullman Co. v. Kelly, 86 Miss. 87.
And this suffering from such humiliation must be inseparable from the
injuries sustained. IWeston Brewing Co. v. Meredith, 166 Ill. 306; Mc-
Dermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 6oo; Sherwood v. Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co.,
82 Mich. 374. But the taking into consideration of the humiliation caused
by a defective physical condition has been held objectionable in assessing
damages. Cullen v. Higgins, 216 Ill. 78. Because mortification and dis-
tress of mind caused by a physical defect is too remote to constitute an
element of damages. Southern Pac. Co. v. Hetzer, 135 Fed. 272.
DIVORcE-EFFEcT-SuPPORT OF CHILD.-STATE V. SEGHERS, 49 So. 998
(LA.).-Held, a father's obligation to support his child is not dissolved by
a divorce, and the assignment of the custody of the child to the wife does
not relieve him from his duty.
The general rule is that after divorce it is the duty of the husband to
support the children of the marriage. Thomas v. Thomas, 41 Wis. 229;
Courtwright v. Courtwright, 40 Mich, 633. And where the decree con-
tains no provision for their support, the court has the power to make an
order directing the father to provide for them. Washburn v. Catlin, 97
N. Y. 623. The wife may even pledge the father's credit for necessaries
furnished to a child in her custody, for which the father would be liable.
Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292. On the contrary it has been held that no
liability devolves upon the former husband for the support of the children
where the judgment imposes none. Hampton v. Allee, 56 Kan. 461; Finch
v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411. And the wife can at most sue him for contribu-
tion. Pawling v. Willson, i3 Johns (N. Y.) 192.
ELECrIONS-UsE OF VOTING MACHINEs---CNsITUTIOnALITY.-STATE
Ex EEL. KARLINGER v. BOARD OF DEPUTY STATE Sup'Rs. OF ELECTIONS, 89
N. E. 33 (OuIo).-Held, that an act providing for the use of voting ma-
chines at elections is void, because repugnant to that article of the state
constitution which ordains that "all elections shall be by ballot." Crew and
Davis, J.J., dissenting.
In re Voting Machines, ig I. I. 728, which appears to have been the
first case to decide the question as to the right to use a voting machine
under a constitutional provision for voting by ballot, was decided in the
affirmative. The question seems to hinge on whether a vote given or cast
by a voting machine, is a vote "given by ballot" within the intendment
of a constitution to that effect. City of Detroit v. Board of Inspectors of
Election, 139 Mich. 548. So long as an absolutely certain meaning is not
opposed in interpreting a constitution an adherence to its strict rules may
be disregarded. Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 540. And the courts with entire
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unanimity declare that "election by ballot" simply means to give to the
individual a secret vote as distinguished from a vote viva voce. Ex parte
Arnold, 128 Mo. 261. The majority rule seems to accord with the prin-
ciple laid down in the opinion of In re Voting Machine, supra, that the use
of voting machines does not contravene the provision of a constitution that
all elections shall be by ballot. Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261; Lynch
v. Malley, 215 Ill. 574.
EVIDENCE-PAROL EViDENCE AFFEcTING WRITINGS-CONSIDERATION OF
DEAD.-LouIsvILLE & N. R Co. v. WILLDANKS, 65 S. E. 86 (GA.).-Where
one by deed conveys to a railroad company, absolutely and unconditionally,
a right of way, it was held, that it could not be shown by a parol agreement
that the real consideration was other than that expressed in the deed.
Atkinson, J., dissenting.
The general rule is that in absence of fraud or mistake, parol evidence
cannot be received to add to, limit, vary, or contradict the terms of a
deed. Elliot v. Weed, 44 Conn. ig; Kelly v. Saltmarsh, 146 Mass. 585;
Uihlein v. Mathews, 172 N. Y. 154. And also parol evidence is inadmissible
to establish a part of a consideration, as to which the deed is silent.
Schrimper v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 115 Iowa 35. But on the con-
trary it has been held that the actual consideration for a deed may be
shown by parol evidence. Ely v. Wolcott, 86 Mass. 5o6. For example it
was held that a plaintiff could show by parol evidence that the agreement
of a defendant to erect and maintain a station on an adjoining tract was
the real consideration for a deed of a right of way. St. Louis & N. A. R.
Co. v. Crandall, 86 S. W. 855 (Ark.).
EVIDENCE-PAROL EvIDENCE-LEAsES.-ERNEST TRIF.LHORN, INC. V.
HANAVAN, 116 N. Y. SuvP. 632.-Held, that in an action for rent due
under a written lease, an oral agreement by a landlord to make repairs
may be shown, when made as an inducement to the execution of a lease
silent on the subject, at or before the signing of the lease, together with
proof that the repairs were not completed, and that the tenant did not
occupy the premises. Goff, J., dissenting.
The general rule as held in the case above, is that parol evidence is
admissible to show an independent agreement made as an inducement to
a written contract, notwithstanding the written contract contains no re-
ference to such agreement. Downey v. Hatter, 48 S. W. 32 (Tex.). But on
the contrary it has been held that in an action on a written lease, the lessee
cannot prove that he signed it on the faith of parol representations that
certain defects in the premises, then known to him, would be repaired by
the lessor. Hall v. Beston, I65 N. Y. 632. The dissenting judge denies
the doctrine of the case at hand, that a parol inducement is admissible, on
the grounds that parol evidence of other obligations cannot be introduced,
where a contract purports to contain the entire agreement of the parties,
in that it tends to vary the terms of a written instrument. McConnell v.
Pierce, xi6 Ill. App. 1o3; Black v. Bachelder, i2o Mass. 171. And such
parol evidence is clearly excluded in the case of a contemporaneous parol
agreement, not a part of the inducement. Haycock v. Johnson, 8r Minn
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49. But it can be used to prove any distinct subsequent oral agreement to
rescind a written contract. Bannon v. Aultman, 8o Wis. 307.
JUDGMENT-JUDGMENT AS BAR-IDENTITY OF QUESTION IN ISSUE.-
MESSINGER V. ANDERSON, 171 FED. 785 (OHIo) .- Held, that where the
parties in two actions were the same and the question at issue is identical,
as the construction of the provision of a will, the judgment in the first
action is a bar to the second, if properly pleaded, although different
property is the subject matter of litigation in the two actions.
To sustain a plea of former judgment in bar of a second action, it
must appear that the cause of action in both suits is the same, or that
some fact essential to the maintenance of the second action was at issue
in the first action and was then determined adversely to the plaintiff.
Perry v. Dickerson, 85 N. Y. 345. However, the courts do not appear to
be in accord with the case at hand, for to render a judgment a bar, the
subject matter of the second action must be shown to be the same as in
the first. Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa i99; King v. Chase, 15 N. H.
9. But the preponderance of authority however seems to be that the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, on a question directly in-
volved in the suit is conclusive in the second suit, between the parties,
although the subject matter of the second action is different than that of
the first. Doty v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 71; Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cowen 120.
MASTER AND SERVANT-"FELLOW SERVANT"-."VICE PRINCIPAI
' "-WHO
AR.-MCINTYRE v. TEBBETTS, 12o S. W. 621 (Mo.).-A manufacturer
maintained a wagon for hauling. The servant in charge of the wagon had
authority to employ men needed to assist him in the work, and he com-
manded them in the work. He and the men under him loaded the wagon.
The servant drove the team. After a stop, one of the men, while attempt-
ing to climb on the front end where he was expected to ride, was injured
in consequence of the servant starting the team. Held, as a matter of
law, that the servant was in driving the team a fellow servant of the men.
Nortoni, J., dissenting.
The above decision is supported by Northern P. R. Co. v. Charles, 162
U. S. 359, and Page v. Battle Creek P. F. Co., 142 Mich. i7. In the latter
case an employe in charge of a department with power to hire and discharge
men, by his negligence caused injury to another servant. Yet such em-
ployee is held to be a vice principal in Russ v. Wab. West R. Co., 112 Mo.
45, under facts not essentially different; and a representative of his mas-
ter in A. G. S. R. R. Co. v. Vail, 142 Ala. I34. The nature of the act
causing the injury, however, seems to be the true test. Shelton v. Pac.
Lbr. Co., 140 Cal. 5o7. In some of his acts he may perform the master's
duty to the master's servants, while in others he may act as a fellow ser-
vant. McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157. If the act is a personal duty
of the master, the employee is a vice principal. Scott v. C. G. W. R. Co.,
113 Ia. 381; Dube v. Lewiston, 83 Me. 211. So when the duty is one which
the law requires of the master. Capper v. Louisville, Evansville & St.
Louis R. Co., 1o3 Ind. 3o5. But if the act is one pertaining only to the
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duty of an operative, the employee performing it is a fellow servant.
Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516; Findlay v. Russel Wheel and Foundry
Co., io8 Mich. 286. So the injury may be chargeable in part to the negli-
gence of a fellow servant, yet if the negligence of a vice principal con-
tributed to the injury, which would not have occured but for such negli-
gence, the master is liable. C. Union Traction Co. v. Sawnsch, 218 Ill. 130.
TkLEGRAPHS AND TLEPHONES - FAILURE To DEIVER MESSAGE -
MEAsuE OF DAMAGEs.-WEsTERN UNION TELEGRAPH Co. v. LEAGUE, 12r
S. W. 484 (K.).-Held, that the plaintiff could recover damages for
mental anguish resulting from the failure to deliver a telegram announcing
the death of her sister.
The majority of decisions hold that damages cannot be recovered for
mental anguish caused by the negligent delay in the delivery of a telegram,
announcing the death of a relative. West v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 39 Kan. 93 ;'Kester v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 55 Fed. 6o3. As
such damages are too uncertain and speculative. Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 471. But there are numerous decisions in
favor of a recovery. So. Relic v. Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 3o8; Mentzer v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 Ia. 752. For if a message announces
death it is notice to the company of an urgent delivery. Reese v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 123 Ind. 294. Even where mental anguish is the
only damage done, recovery may be had. Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Cunningham, 99 Ala. 314; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Newhouse,
6 Ind. App. 422. In one jurisdiction it is held that damages for mental
anguish may be recovered if the action is ex contractu, but not if it is
ex delicto. Blount v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1:26 Ala. xo5.
